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Issues and Findings
Discussed in this Research in
Brief: How eight State and Federal
prisons have dealt with riots and
what strategies and procedures are
effective during the stages of a
prison riot.
Key issues: Safety of prison employees, inmates, and residents of
the area in which the facility is located, plus the financial cost of
prison riots makes their prevention
and containment a critical issue.
Factors that must be addressed in'Jde such criminal justice issues as
, 10W prisons are administered (and
how command is divided during riots), race relations in prisons, how
prisons are built and renovated,
how prisons are staffed, and how
staff are utilized and augmented
during riots.
Findings: On the basis of an
indepth examination of eight disturbances, the study concluded
that proactive planning and preparation along with reactive problem
solving is the most effective approach to prison riot resolution. A
prison's riot plan should include:
• A command structure with welldefined lines of authority.

e Clear guidelines on the use of
force, including staff and weapons
assignments.
e Interagency cooperation terms
·'"tat specify the roles of such units
continued • , .
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Resolution of Prison Riots
by Bert Useem, Camille Graham Camp, George M. Camp, and Renie Dugan

Because prison riots have occurred all
too often, they can be anticipated in
the future. An indepth study sponsored
by the National Institute of Justice and
the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
examined eight disturbances to understand how prison riots have been re"
solved and to consider strategies to
prepare for, settle, and recover from
them more effectively at the lowest
cost to all parties. Roadblocks to the
successful resolution of prison riots
often stem from the same misunderstandings and miscommunications experienced in ordinary life, multiplied by
the pressures of the event. Successful
resolutions require a controlled, measured response: an orderly command
post, clear lines of authority, effective
communication, appreciation of the
consequences of alternative lines of
action, and a sense among corrections
staff that their skills and training are
adequate to the challenge at hand.
This Research in Brief highlights what
was learned from prison administrators
and from reports, interviews, and historical data from the eight incidents. A
brief description of each event is followed by a discussion of strategies and
procedures to use during the three
phases of a prison riot: before, during,
and after. 1

The incidents
Kirkland Correctional Institution
(Kirkland)--South Carolina. The
Kirkland facility was generally well managed at the time of the disturbance of April
I, 1986, and so was the riot's resolution.
The riot began in a housing unit holding
the prison's most violent and disruptive inmates. Inmates seized control of this unit,
scaled the fence around it, and then used
construction tools left on the grounds to release 700 general-population inmates. The
riot command post functioned smoothly,
resolving the disturbance in 6 hours.

U.S. Penitentiary (Atlanta)--Georgia. On
November 10, 1987, the U.S. State Department announced that Cuba had agreed to
reinstate a 1984 accord that would permit
the repatriation of up to 2,500 Cuban nationals. Included would be Cubans who
had fled in the 1980 Mariel boatlift but
who, once released on "immigration parole," had been convicted of a crime and
were now detained in one of two Federal
prisons. Three days after the announcement, the detainees seized control of the
U.S. Penitentiary in Atlanta (part of the
Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Justice). Their principal demand was that they
not be repatriated to Cuba. The uprising
lasted 11 days, involved more than 100
hostages, and required protracted negotiations to resolve.
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Issues and Findings
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as the State Police and the local fire
department.

e Training programs that address
tactical strategies and mental readiness for emergencies.
Strategies to prevent and deal with
riots must address many factors,
including:

e Maintaining supervision of an experienced staff who follow sound security practices.
e Ensuring the security of the physical plant and equipment.
e Discerning the signs of a probable
riot from false clues and relaying reliable information up the chain of
command.

e Selecting the most appropriate
means of resolving a riot: use of
force, negotiations, or a combination
of tactics.

e Using strategies that range from
immediate use of force to waiting
until inmate leaders are ready to
negotiate.

e Addressing issues of staff morale
and emotional support after a riot
ends.

e Incorporating the lessons learned
from experiences with disturbances
into revised riot plans.
Target Audience: Prison administrators, State and local policymakers,
law enforcement practitioners.
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Mack Alford Correctional Center (Mack
Alford)-Oklahoma_ The riot that occurred at this medium-security institution between May 13 and 15, 1988, was
preceded by a 6-hour period during
which black and white inmates milled
about in crowds, expressing antagonism
toward each other and toward authoriti es. Despite attempts to defuse the situation, a corrections official was taken
hostage late in the evening, marking the
start of the riot. Over a 2-hour period, inmates seized seven more hostages and
took over two-thirds of the prison. No
substantive issues were raised during the
3-day disturbance, which was eventually
resolved through a combination of negotiation, exhaustion on the part of the inmates, and defection by inmates who no
longer wanted to participate.
Coxsackie Correctional Facility (Coxsackie)-New York. Coxsackie houses
primarily maximum-security inmates;
the institution's Special Housing Unit
(SHU) is for inmates segregated from the
others to serve disciplinary terms for serious violations of the rules. For approximately 14 hours, on August 1 and 2,
1988, 32 SHU inmates held several officers hostage and destroyed much of the
SHU facility. The riot began when an inmate assaulted an officer in the exercise
yard; the five officers working in the
SHU that day were not regularly assigned to this unit, so they were not as
familiar with procedures as those who
worked there routinely. Stafffrom the facility and the central office established
communications with the inmates almost
immediately after the SHU was overtaken and remained in contact during
the time it took negotiators to bring
about resolution.
Idaho State Correctional Institution
(ISCI). ISCI houses medium-custody inmates as well as close-custody inmates
(those who are dangerous and difficult to
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manage), inmates in administrative segregation and detention, and those awaiting execution. On September 28, 1988,
inmates in a close-custody housing unit
refused to return to their cells after having been observed drinking a homemade alcoholic beverage. They then
used an unsecured table to break into
the unit's control center. The riot was
eventually brought under control by an
ultimatum and riot squad deployment.
Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Camp Hill (Camp Hill)- Since
1975 Camp Hill had been an adult correctional facility, housing minimum- and
medium-security inmates. On October
25, 1989, inmates returning from an exercise yard in the late afternoon overwhelmed correctional staff and seized
eight hostages. The riot ended through
negotiations, and inmates were confined
to cells. The next day the superintendent
met with the inmates to discuss their
grievances. In a development unknown
to him, many of the cells to which the inmates had been confined were not secure, permitting the start of a second riot
later that same day. Five more hostages
were taken. Negotiations were again attempted, but the riot finally ended when
State police forcibly entered the
compound.
Arizona State Prison Complex
(Cimarron) Cimarron Unit. This onehour disturbance by inmates at the
Cimarron Unit of the Arizona State
Prison Complex at Tucson initially pitted
inmates against inmates. It began as a
fight over a cigarette lighter and escalated into a large, racially divided brawl.
When prison administrators intervened,
inmates turned on them, and force had to
be used to end the disturbance.
Federal Correctional Institution
(Talladega )-Alabama. Changes
prompted by the 1987 Cuban detainee
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riots at the U.S. Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, and at the Federal Detention Center in Oakdale, Louisiana,
were put to the test 4 years later when
Cuban detainees rioted at Talladega
between August 21 and 30, 1991. After hostages had been held for lO days,
prison administrators concluded that
their health and safety were at increasing risk and prospects for a negotiated
settlement were dim. A carefully
planned and rehearsed assault, maximizing the element of surprise, ended
the incident without serious injuries to
the hostages or detainees.

Procedures and strategies:
before the riot
All prison administrators make efforts
to avoid disturbances but also prepare
for their occurrence. In the riots studied, various planning and avoidance
measures were used with varying degrees of success.
Riot preparation includes the acquisition of resources (organization, equipment, and information) for use in a riot
situation, the development of a strategy for the use of these resources, and
the mental readiness to respond to an
incident. The importance of advance
preparation in all its manifestations
cannot be overstated. Three elements
are especially important: command,
planning, and training.
Riot preparation: issues of
command
Crucial to the resolution of any riot is
command-the ability to exercise authority and direction over the forces
and resources available. This encompasses the capacity to deploy the
forces at hand, monitor their actions in
the field on a continuous basis, deliver
orders promptly and effectively, coordinate operations with other State and
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Who Should Take Command in a Prison Riot?
he level of command during a
prison riot depends on several factors:

the commitment of the central office to
his or her leadership.

• Knowledge of the facility.

• Links between responsibility and
authority.

However, if the warden is new, someone
else who has spent more time at the facility (a central office administrator, for
example) may be more familiar with it.
Each situation must be weighed individually. In some cases, a team approach may
be warranted to capitalize on the knowledge and skill of each individual.

• The administrative framework.

Central office administrator

Some of these factors favor assigning
command to the warden, but others indicate the central office administrator or
the commissioner may be more appropriate in particular situations.

Because of their experience across a
range of situations, central office administrators may have a more developed understanding of resolution strategies. They
are more likely, as well, to have greater
insight into the effects of disturbances on
the department or corrections as a whole
than those whose primary identification
may be with a particular facility. Additionally, their experiences in dealing with
agencies and resources outside the department can be brought to bear, if
necessary.

• Effects on the chain of command.
• Breadth of experience, responsibility,
and communication.

The warden
Because details vary from one facility to
the next, one unit to the next, and one
shift to the next, some agencies feel that
overall authority should remain in the
hands of the warden, who has greater
overall knowledge of the facility. This
knowledge may enable him or her to
more quickly assess the situation and
recognize the consequences of different
courses of action.
To many corrections administrators, another compelling argument for keeping
riot resolution in the hands of the warden concerns maintaining the chain of
command in the aftermath. Taking away
the warden's authority during a disturbance, it is argued, may undermine his
or her subsequent authority; midlevel
managers, correctional officers, and inmates alike will view the central office,
not the warden, as the real authority.
Allowing the warden to remain in command for the riot's duration reaffirms

~ I.

The commissioner
In other cases, it is argued that because
the commissioner bears ultimate responsibility for the resolution, decision making
authority should reside in his or her
hands. Moreover, in agencies in which
the decision making power tends to be
concentrated in the central office, existing practice may dictate that the commissioner take direct charge of the
resolution. The commissioner can follow
the procedures he or she and others in
the central office have established. By
contrast, in decentralized departments in
which wardens have greater latitude, it
may be more advantageous for the warden to remain in command.

•••
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Federal agencies, and gather and interpret information on what inmates
are doing and intend to do. The longer
a riot lasts, the more agencies that hecome involved, and the larger the area
and the number of hostages held by inmates, the more complex command hecomes. The challenge is met, in part,
through achieving unity of command
and determining the necessary level
and location of command.

trust among its members. In the riots
studied this was achieved to varying
degrees. At Kirkland, the command
group evidenced a strong level of trust
within the group. Members supported
each other and allowed open expression of views and impartial exploration
of options. As a result, the command
team could focus on the task at hand
and act decisively.

Unity of command. Unity of command
refers to the principle that members of
an organization are accountable to a
single superior vested with the requisite authority to coordinate personnel
efforts to achieve common objectives.
In its absence, coordination may still
he achieved through voluntary mutual
cooperation, but this may break down
if disagreements arise.

rectly related to unity of command is
level of command (which official in the
correctional hierarchy will be in
charge) and location of command
(where the key command post will be
established). With regard to level of
command, decisionmaking authority
may reside in the prison, usually with
the warden, or within the agency's
larger administrative framework, with
either a regional or agency director.
(See "Who Should Take Command in
a Prison Riot?") Additionally, a prison
riot is the sort of public emergency in
which higher officials may feel the need
to step in and exercise command
themselves.

Unity of command was not fully
achieved at Camp Hill. Although the
State Police had traditionally assumed
control over the resolution of Pennsylvania prison riots, the division of authority between the State Police and
the Corrections Department had not
been clearly delineated before the incident. During the disturbance, tension developed between the two
agencies, and issues that should have
been settled before the disturbance
(such as the particular type of ammunition that the State Police would
carry) had to he resolved on the spot,
taking up precious time. Since the riot,
great strides have been taken to establish a firmer working relationship
among State agencies.
Unity of command can he impaired by
divisions among command personnel.
Although one individual is formally in
charge, command is almost always a
team effort. One task in riot preparation is to forge a team and develop

Level and location of command. Di-

With regard to location of command,
offsite decisionmakers may choose to
go to the facility or may choose to remain offsite, either in their administrative offices or a preestablished
emergency operations center.
Location and level of command should
he determined as part of overall emergency planning. Arguing in favor of local control, both in level and location,
is the need for the commander to
readily size up the situation. This requires knowing the layout of the facility, the obstacles that might be
encountered in an assault, the backgrounds of the inmates involved, the
multitude of standing orders, and the
capabilities of onsite staff.
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In instances in which it is decided that
authority for the resolution of the riot
resides outside the prison, an additional decision must be made regarding where to situate the command post.
Some of the same advantages of local
command may be gained by situating
the command post at the facility itself.
On the other hand, it takes time to establish and staff a command post in
the field, and the resources (for example, communication networks and
office equipment), if mobilized rapidly,
may be inadequate. If decisionmakers
operate from an existing offsite facility,
the amount of time and effort needed
to establish the field command post
may be focused on the incident itself.
At both Coxsackie and ISCI, the commissioner took direct control of the
resolution of the riots. Significant decisions were deferred (to the extent feasible) until the commissioner arrived
on the scene. The commissioner became, in effect, both the final authority
and the field commander. At Mack
Alford, the warden was given the primary responsibility for designing and
executing the resolution. The commissioner saw his role as establishing a
framework to assist the warden. He
served as a sounding board for the warden, providing advice and direction; he
met with State political leaders to assure
them that all that could be done was being done, thus insulating the warden
from political pressure; and he mobilized resources to put at the warden's
disposal. The commissioner allowed the
warden to make key decisions so long as
he continued to have confidence in the
warden's performance.
Kirkland, Atlanta, Talladega, and
Camp Hill each represents a somewhat
different approach. At Kirkland the
commissioner and members of his
executive staff met with the warden .

•••
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Although it was clear that the commissioner was the ultimate authority, the
group functioned more like an executive committee working jointly to develop a solution. Command was
somewhat fluid, allowing discussion
of the options based on their merits.
At Atlanta both the Federal Regional
Director and the warden were at the
prison soon after the riot began. It was
decided to give local authority to the
Regional Director, but because of the
duration of the riot, it was necessary to
develop teams to rotate in and out of
leadership positions. In Washington,
the Attorney General and the Director
of the BOP maintained direct oversight
of the resolution.
At Camp Hill, the commissioner took
the position that responsibility for the
riot's resolution rested with the superintendent. In practice, however, he
involved himself in a number of
important decisions that resulted in
some fracturing of command.

Riot preparation: planning
A riot plan should be a comprehensive
guide that describes the special responsibilities to be met, the resources
to be used, and the contribution of
each individual or group involved. It
should embody the correctional
agency's principles and strategies for
resolution.
Riot plans are too often a weakly integrated compendium of policy statements, advice, memos, and agreements
among agencies. Cumbersome plans
are likely to receive lip service but be
ignored during a disturbance. Plans
should be well-organized, clearly written, and concise. They should include
procedures for how the riot plan book
is to be used during an incident; the
book itself is often left behind in the
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heat of the moment. Guidelines for developing a riot plan, produced as part
of this study, are highlighted on the
following pages.
Use-of-force guidelines. A critical element of emergency planning is a useof-force policy. Which staff members
are authorized to order the use of
force? What responses are appropriate
in various situations? What weapons
and less-than-lethal munitions (e.g,
tear gas) are appropriate for use in
specific situations? These policies
should be based on both sound correctional practices and evolving law on
the use of force to quell prison riots.
Interagency cooperation. In the event
that the assistance of other agencies is
required (for medical care, additional
security forces, or investigative teams,
for example), the riot plan should include contact names and telephone
numbers and an outline of existing
agreements between agencies. These
would have been useful at Camp Hill
to clarify the roles and responsibilities
of the State Police and at Idaho, where
a municipal fire company hesitated in
responding to a call for help.

Riot preparation: training
Although planning can be conducted
in an agency's central office for the
agency as a whole or in the warden's
office for a particular facility, mental
readiness can be achieved only
through field practice and instruction.
The South Carolina Department of
Corrections has developed a rigorous
training program for its wardens,
deputy wardens, and other senior
prison managers. An annual 3-day
training seminar combines classroom
instruction with field practice to ensure readiness to handle emergencies.
In addition, demanding, unannounced
onsite riot scenarios are conducted in
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South Carolina facilities. Participants
later write up their experiences and offer recommendations for improving the
department's emergency procedures.
These training efforts had observable
payoffs in the incidents examined in
this study.
In training it is important to ensure
that different components of the response team will work to assist one another. Exercises should integrate the
activities of command, hostage negotiation teams, and tactical teams; otherwise these components will be
unfamiliar with the operation of the
others. If a riot plan calls for the assistance of State Police or other agencies,
much can be gained from joint training
with those agencies.

Riot avoidance
Some riots come as a complete surprise; others flow rather directly from a
snowballing set of events in which the
forces of disorder gain momentum.
Still others take place in situations
known to be unusually dangerous and
with a significant degree of warning.
These three configurations present different opportunities for riot avoidance.
Riots with no warning. The riots at
Talladega, Kirkland, Coxsackie, and
ISCI occurred without significant
warning. All but the ISCI riot occurred
in high-security units. The ISCI riot
began in a unit that had been constructed as medium-security housing,
but the inmates housed there were
classified as close-custody (more dangerous and difficult to manage than the
medium-security inmates).
In units where violent and rebellious
inmates are concentrated, prison
administrators rely in large part on the
physical elements of security to prevent violence. When riots do occur,

•

in

Research

they are primarily a function of opportunity; that is, they take place when
one or several inmates are able to initiate a disturbance by taking advantage of a weakness in or a momentary
lapse of the security system and are
subsequently able to spread the disturbance by defeating other security systems. While no system is absolutely
foolproof, riot avoidance can be
achieved through a combination of constant vigilance and physical control.
• Experienced staff and supervision. In
a high-security unit, the continuous
presence of experienced staff, both
line officers and supervisors, is a
sound security practice. This was not
fully achieved at Coxsackie, where the
officers regularly assigned to the highsecurity Special Housing Unit were
absent on the day of the disturbance.
The replacement officers were not as
familiar with the unit's procedures.
Moreover, responsibility for supervising the unit, normally vested in a sergeant assigned full time to the unit,
had been temporarily transferred to a
sergeant whose regular assignment was
elsewhere in the facility. One of the
postriot procedural changes was to require that a sergeant be present in the
unit at all times. Relief officers were
also given more thorough orientation to
SHU procedures.
• Post orders. All post orders, especially for posts in restricted units,
should anticipate the possibility of an
incident. At ISCI, correctional administrators removed an inmate from a
unit while other inmates in the same
unit were not confined to their cells.
Had the post orders required that all
inmates be in their cells before an
inmate was removed, the rebellion
could not have developed. At Kirkland's Unit D, the post orders did not
specify the keys the evening duty

Brief

officer should and should not carry
when entering the unit. The keys to the
cell doors were not needed when entering the unit, but the officer first
taken hostage was carrying them, and
this permitted the incident to expand.
• Physical plant and equipment. Physical plant weaknesses allowed disturbances at some of the institutions to
spread. At Coxsackie, the wire-reinforced glass surrounding the control
center was easily broken by inmates.
Funds that had been requested for replacing the glass had not yet been approved. At Talladega the line of vision
to the small recreation yard where inmates first gained control was obscured by an electrical transformer.
ISCI's dayroom contained heavy furniture that inmates used to break into
the control room.

Escalation of existing conflict. The
disturbances at Mack Alford Correctional Center and the Cimarron Unit of
the Arizona State Prison at Tucson
both resulted from escalating events.
The events leading to the two riots followed a common pattern. First, on the
day of the disturbances a dispute
among inmates inflamed preexisting
intergroup tensions. Second, the conflicts gained momentum because of a
series of retaliatory moves. Third, opposing groups of inmates mobilized,
leading to the confrontation.
The two riots actually began when staff
intervened and inmates redirected
their hostility against them. At Mack
Alford this occurred when an officer
without backup pursued an inmate
who resisted his transfer to another
prison. The inmate took the officer
hostage; shortly thereafter, other inmates joined the disturbance, seizing
additional hostages and territory. At
Cimarron the riot began when a fight
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between two inmates broke out along
racial lines in the chow line and then
turned into a brawl in the cafeteria before spilling into the yard.
Riot avoidance in these situations lies
in managing the stages of escalation.
At Mack Alford the administration
had, over a 6-hour period, skillfully
managed a potentially explosive situation (made more difficult by a shortage
of detention cells). Only late in the
process was an officer taken hostage.
At Cimarron, once the conflict had
reached the intensity of a brawl in the
cafeteria, there was little opportunity
to reverse the process because the officers on the scene were quickly
overwhelmed.
Riots with warning. It is common for
facility administrators to hear rumors
and predictions of riots. Of course,
from time to time the warnings are
genuine. Often, however, such rumors
are exaggeration or hearsay. They may
even be deliberate attempts to create a
crisis, either for its own sake or to
force change.
How may prison administrators recognize a facility that is truly on the brink
of a disturbance? The American Correctional Association identifies 27
"indicators of prison tension that often
precede riots and disturbances." 2
They include an increase in disciplinary hearings, warnings by inmates to
officers that they should take vacation
or sick leave, and an increase in
employee turnover.
Yet no such list is infallible. The presence of "traditional indicators" might
well signal danger, but their absence
does not necessarily ensure safetynot in the face of other "nontraditional" evidence, nor in a situation in
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which tensions are known to be high.
Moreover, evidence obtained from
within the prison needs to be combined with an understanding of what
kinds of situations or grievances are
likely to produce riots.
The events leading up to the start of
the riot at the U.S. Penitentiary at Atlanta on November 23, 1987, illustrate
the difficulties of distinguishing valid
warnings from false ones. During the
2-day period immediately preceding
the Atlanta riot, there was evidence
that a riot might be impending. Detainees in one unit had remained
dressed overnight, the volume of outgoing mail was reported to be several
times heavier than normal, and much
of it contained photographs. 3 In retrospect it appears that inmates were
mailing these photographs to avoid
their being lost or destroyed in the
riot. 4 At the time, the increased volume was explained as the result of a
new program allowing detainees to
have pictures taken of themselves.
However, the staff had observed detainees removing their family photographs from their lockers.
The Atlanta officials were mindful of
the possibility of a riot. The warden
met several times with his executive
staff and department heads to determine whether a lockdown was warranted. Still, the evidence they had
obtained was never quite sufficient. 5
Thus, in some contexts, warnings really do predict riots; in others, they
may be discounted. Warning signs
should be the starting point of an investigation, not the basis on which
conclusions are drawn and policy is
formulated. Questions such as these
should be asked and answered in detail: Is the source of information reliable? Are such warnings out of the
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ordinary? Are predictions of trouble
widely shared or are they held by only
a few? Do the signs indicate serious
unrest among inmates or merely routine grumbling? Administrators are
much better prepared to interpret the
answers to these questions if they
know their institutions and inmate
populations thoroughly.

During the riot
Prison administrators have three main
options to attempt to bring about resolution. They may forcibly retake the
prison (the tactical solution), they may
end the riot through talking (the negotiation solution), or they may let the

•

riot die of its own accord (the waiting
solution).
In actual riots, such as those studied,
the boundaries between these strategies may become indistinct. Negotiations can be used to collect information
for a tactical assault or to tire and demoralize the inmates so they will surrender. A waiting policy can be used
to strengthen the administration's tactical capabilities or, if used in conjunction with deprivation of food,
water, or electricity, to force inmates to
bargain seriously. A visible tactical
mobilization may permit inmates to
see more clearly the consequences of
failed negotiations or it may wear them

Responses to Riot Warnings
f there appears to be a high probability that a riot is imminent, administrators may take administrative or diplomatic
actions to prevent it.

Administrative actions include a lockdown
of a unit or the entire facility; transfer of
suspected instigators to a segregated unit
or another facility; cancellation of activities
that give inmates the opportunity to congregate, such as recreation or work; an increased presence of correctional officers
who, by posture and words, convey that
they will not permit a disturbance; and a
search for contraband.
Diplomatic actions include efforts to convince inmates that a riot would be costly to
them personally, counterproductive to reform, or unnecessary because their grievances will be addressed in the future.
Administrative and diplomatic actions can
be used in combination. Potential instigators may be removed from prisons and the
issues around which they are mobilizing
resolved. Sometimes, however, strategies
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conflict. At Atlanta, administrators felt
themselves forced to choose between a
primarily administrative strategy and a primarily diplomatic strategy. They reasoned
that a lockdown could not be counted on
to be effective. Some detainees were
housed in dormitory units that could not
be locked down, and the cell doors in the
administrative segregation section were
old and possibly defective. At the same
time, a lockdown might further inflame
already angry detainees and precipitate
"the very riot a lockdown [was) intended
to prevent. " 25 Had the BOP had the
names of the inmates who were slated
for deportation, it could have locked
down those inmates in secure cells and
used its skills in persuasion to convince
others not to start trouble. This information, however, was not available. Forced
to choose between the two strategies,
the administration selected a primarily
diplomatic approach.
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down. Still, at any given time prison
administrators must commit themselves
to one course or another based on the
costs and benefits of each option.

Tactical solutions: the use of
force
In general, a riot can be terminated at
any time by using overwhelming force.
Nevertheless, such a deployment of
force can be costly. (This is one of the
lessons of the 1971 Attica riot that retains its force today. In the assault at
Attica, 39 people died.) As a consequence, commanders must develop
strategies to minimize the risks to hostages, assault forces, and inmates, as
well as to ensure that the assault force
is invulnerable. Such strategies depend upon the type of force used.
Three types of force were observed in
the riots under study.
Immediate force. Force may be used
as a first response to a disturbance.
Armed personnel may be rushed in to
defend or retake specific areas without
waiting for the riot to expand to its potential territorial limit. The key element in achieving the desired result is
the speed with which sufficient numbers of staff can be mobilized,
equipped, and organized.
There are advantages to the early use
of force. As noted above, riots may begin without plan or organization. The
immediate use of force may prevent inmates from becoming organized, from
fashioning weapons, from fortifying
their position, and from recruiting additional participants and expanding
the territorial limits of the riot. It will
also limit the pain and suffering of the
hostages already taken.
Moreover, force used immediately may
deny inmates the opportunity to promise to themselves and to the authorities
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that they will harm the hostages unless
their demands are met. Once such
threats are made, inmates may find it
psychologically difficult to back down
from them. The Atlanta detainees, for
example, consistently promised to kill
hostages if an assault were made. Even
though they may have realized the dire
consequences of such acts, their public commitment to this course of action
might have psychologically obligated
them to make good on it. One of the
disadvantages of negotiations, compared to the early use of force, is that
inmates are given an opportunity to
make threats to which they then may
become committed.
The greatest challenge in the early use
of force is assembling the necessary
personnel and equipment with sufficient speed. A riot control squad deployed too quickly runs the risk of
being overrun and taken hostage. The
tension between the opportunities presented by and dangers posed by early
use of force grew to extraordinary proportions at Kirkland. In the riot's
opening stages, correctional officers in
a housing unit reported to the control
center that armed inmates were breaking into the unit, which was filling with
smoke. Officers were arriving at the facility, but their numbers were insufficient to deploy a squad to rescue the
trapped officers. When the number
reached 35 (command had wanted at
least 100), an assault force was dispatched to rescue the trapped officers.
Once this was achieved, momentum
was behind the riot squad and they began to clear the yard of inmates.
By contrast, at Coxsackie, prison administrators had a compelling reason
to use force immediately because inmates were observed assaulting correctional officers. However, the SHU's
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high-security design impeded quick
access. Therefore, no immediate action
was taken because the inmates threatened to kill the hostages if authorities
tried to use force to resolve the situation, and officials could not have prevented this.
Planned tactical strike. The essence
of the tactical strike is to maximize the
element of surprise. Administrators
deploy staff in an attempt to release
hostages or retake the facility before
inmates can react. The assault at
Talladega was this type. Its key elements were:
• Intelligence. There was a continuous
effort to gather intelligence. Released
hostages were debriefed, and the information obtained from them was used to
assess the inmates' leadership and the
location of hostages.
• Drills and rehearsals. Rehearsals
were conducted that accurately simulated the planned mission. This was
accomplished by conducting drills in a
nearby housing unit that was similar in
construction to the one being held by
inmates.
• Timing. The assault was timed to occur when there was a maximum opportunity of success-in the predawn
hours when inmates were asleep or
generally more subdued. The team's
entry was made under cover of night.
• Unity of command. The assault
force's command unity was at its maximum level. One assault force (the
FBI's Hostage Rescue Team) assumed
sole responsibility for regaining the
building. Other tactical teams from the
FBI and BOP were used in support
roles.
• Weaponry. Arsenal weapons were
used to further diminish the capacity
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of inmates to react. Stun grenades confused and disoriented the detainees.

• Speed. The attack was executed with
great speed. Explosives were used to
breach the entry doors quickly with
minimal injury to those inside. Using
the intelligence that had been gathered, the hostages were quickly located and freed.
• Surprise. No warnings or ultimatums
were issued to the inmates. A meal
was served to the inmates to foster
their feelings of success in negotiations and to lower their vigilance.
The disadvantages of using a tactical
strike to resolve a hostage situation are
twofold. First, it might be unnecessary
because negotiations may resolve the
incident. Even if they do not, inmates
given a choice between surrender and
having force used against them may
choose the former. The problem is that
they cannot make that choice unless it
is offered to them, either implicitly or
explicitly. The purpose of an ultimatum is make the warning explicit.
Second, material conditions and the
vigilance of inmates may make a tactical strike too risky. If inmates hold a
large number of hostages, disperse
them, and threaten to harm them in the
event of an assault, as the Atlanta detainees did with more than 100 hostages, it may not be possible to
overcome their tactical advantage. An
assault under those conditions, however well-executed, would be perilous
at best.
Riot squad formations. A third type of
force is akin to that used by police to
quell an ongoing urban riot. Riot
squads move in unified groups to force
clusters of inmates to move in one direction or to disperse. The essence of
this type of force is reliance on the
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size, discipline, and firepower of the
assembled force to overwhelm inmates
and make them back down. Unlike a
tactical strike, in which an assault
force's presence is concealed as long
as possible, a riot squad's presence is
deliberately established. Batons and
shotguns may be carried not only as
weapons, but also to convince inmates
that resistance is futile. 6
The general strategy is to establish a
cordon around the riot area, using existing geographic breaks (e.g., buildings, exterior or interior fences) where
possible. The purpose of the cordon is
to prevent the riot from expanding in
area and to prevent other inmates from
joining the riot. Once sufficient forces
are in place, the cordoned area is partitioned into smaller zones, which are
then retaken one after another. The
riot ends when the last zone is secured. The force used to end the second riot at Camp Hill was primarily a
riot squad movement. The Cimarron
riot ended through the use of a riot
squad, and at Kirkland a riot squad
was deployed to ensure that the surrender of inmates was orderly.
Negotiations
In a prison riot the term "negotiation"
refers to a dialog between inmates and
authorities that focuses on achieving
an end to the incident. Four of the riots under study ended through negotiations: Camp Hill (the first riot),
Atlanta, Mack Alford, and Coxsackie.
Negotiations were also conducted at
Talladega and (very briefly) at Kirkland
but later abandoned in favor of other approaches. The negotiations observed can
be divided into three types.
Negotiation as bargaining. The dialog
between inmates and prison authorities may be primarily an exercise in
bargaining. Inmates believe they have
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put themselves in a position to bargain
with the State. They may see their hostages and the portion of the facility
they occupy as "chips"; they want to
trade those chips for publicity, amnesty, improved conditions, or other
benefits. The government may respond
to inmates' demands with counter-demands. The resolution comes when the
right bargain is struck. At Atlanta, this
was the release of the hostages in return for a new review process and a
promise not to prosecute. At Camp
Hill (the first riot), inmates released
the hostages after the superintendent
promised to meet with them the next
day to discuss their grievances and to
issue a press release announcing that
meeting.
Negotiation as problem solving.
Inmates may take territory or hostages
simply because they can. In those situations, negotiations become a dialog
aimed less at bargaining and more at
solving actual and perceived problems
posed by the situation and the individuals involved.

Inmate leaders in the Coxsackie riot
issued personal demands that seemed
disproportionate to the disturbances
they created. The main instigator's
principal demand was to speak over
the phone to his stepfather. Apparently, none of the other inmate participants challenged his pursuit of the
issue. Inmates also sought assurances
that staff would not retaliate for the
beatings they inflicted on their hostages or for the riot itself.
Over the years, law enforcement hostage negotiators have learned that it
is usually best to respond as if the
hostage holder's demands are authentic, however odd or seemingly disconnected from the situation, and never to
dismiss them as triviaP At Coxsackie
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these strictures were followed with
success. Administrators arranged for
the inmate leader to talk on the phone
with his stepfather. An agency negotiator spent much of his time trying to
calm the inmates and reassure them
that they would not be injured when
they gave up. A videocamera was put
in place to record the surrender. These
concessions were sufficient to solve
the problems and end the disturbance.
Negotiations as situation management.
State authorities may use negotiations
primarily as a means to manage the
situation. The measure of success is
not whether an agreement is reached
(either through bargaining or by meeting inmates' personal needs), but
whether other goals are achieved: stabilizing the situation, obtaining information about conditions in the unit,
and/or lowering inmates' vigilance
against an assault.
At Talladega, negotiations aimed at
bargaining reached a dead end after
several days. After this, they became
primarily an instrument to manage the
situation. BOP and FBI negotiators
tried to calm the detainees and thereby
reduce the threat to the hostages. In
the riot's final stages, negotiations
were used primarily to support a tactical operation. They were used to obtain information and try to render the
inmates less vigilant.
The distinction among negotiation as
bargaining, as problem-solving, and as
situation management should not be
overdrawn. The first definition sees
resolution as being achieved by bringing together the interests of the agency
and the inmates. The second views
resolution as being achieved by meeting the immediate needs (especially
the emotional needs) of the inmates as
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they articulate them. The third sees
negotiation as a means to stabilize the
situation and, if necessary, to prepare
for a tactical assault. Negotiations always involve all three components.
The distinctions among them are a
matter of emphasis. 8

Parties to negotiations
In approaching negotiations, administrators may assume that they are pitted
against a single, unified group of inmates when, in fact, there may be
schisms among the inmates or no organization whatsoever. Over time, inmates may fuse into a coherent group;
fractionate into competing groups; or
dissolve into small, antagonistic
"pockets. " 9
In many types of negotiations, such as
labor-management bargaining, the distinctions between individuals at the
negotiating table are relatively clearcut, with managers on one side and
elected representatives of the workforce on the other. Prison riots are
more complicated, and identifying who
should sit at the bargaining table is
more difficult.
Inmate negotiators. For progress in
negotiations to occur, there must be an
inmate or group of inmates with whom
officials can talk with a measure of
continuity. These negotiating inmates
must be able to sway other inmates;
otherwise an agreement to end a riot is
of little value. At Mack Alford the inmates who initiated the disturbance
continued to exercise control over the
disturbance and negotiated with prison
administrators. At Camp Hill (the first
riot), a group of inmates also emerged
as leaders with whom prison authorities could negotiate. At Coxsackie one
inmate took responsibility for negotiations, but toward the end of the distur-
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bance he seemed to be losing control
over the others.
In the early stages of the Atlanta incident, no individual inmate or group
emerged with whom officials could negotiate, although on the first day four
inmates presented government negotiators with a list of demands, claiming
that they represented the rest. Soon,
however, other inmates contacted government negotiators asserting their authority. At that stage none of the
groups seemed genuinely interested in
reaching a settlement. 10 This absence
of leadership took government negotiators by surprise. Eventually, a loose
coalition of inmates formed and bargained with government officials in
good faith. By the 11th day of rioting,
the coalition had gained sufficient leverage among the rioters to effect the
release of the hostages after signing
the agreement.
The problem of inmate leadership was
more grave at Talladega. The detainees argued among themselves from the
beginning. Administrators attempted
to create a leadership group among the
detainees. In one instance they acceded to a demand made by a relatively moderate detainee in the hope
that he would gain stature in the eyes
of the other detainees. However, a
moderate leadership group never
coalesced; the detainees and the administration remained far apart on the
1ssues.
Agency negotiators. The theory behind hostage negotiation teams is now
well established. A small group of administrators receives special training
in hostage negotiations. They are chosen carefully, on the basis of intelligence, levelheadedness, verbal skills,
ability to think on their feet, and over-
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.til appearance. Their job during a disturbance is to negotiate a settlement
through bargaining and problem
solving. Those with command
(decisionmaking) authority refrain
from talking directly to inmates.
The separation between commander
and negotiators is said to have several
advantages. The commander can make
decisions under less stressful conditions. Negotiators can stall for time by
referring requests and demands to a
higher authority. If negotiators become
overinvolved in the process, begin to
lose objectivity, or experience high
levels of stress, command personnel
can take corrective action. There may
be information the negotiators should
not have because they might inadvertently reveal it (for example, that an assault is imminent) but which the
person in command knows. Additionlily, the division between command
and negotiation may allow negotiators
to develop greater rapport with hostage
holders. The government negotiator
can appear to the inmates to be taking
their side in gaining concessions from
command and so develop the inmates'
goodwill. u
This model was followed at both Atlanta and Talladega. At Atlanta, several hours after the riot began, a BOP
lieutenant made the first contact with a
detainee and arranged for a face-toface negotiation session. He was soon
joined by FBI negotiators, who then
assumed control over the negotiations
for the duration of the event. At
Talladega a counselor assigned to the
unit made the initial contact with the
detainees and started negotiations.
Later that evening, he withdrew from
the negotiations; and trained negotiators from the prison, the FBI, and the
BOP took over.
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Coxsackie and Mack Alford followed
different sequences. At Coxsackie, the
first conversations occurred between
the inmates and the department's negotiators as well as the deputy superintendent of the institution. About 5
hours into the disturbance, the Assistant Commissioner for the department
began to talk to the inmates in response to their demand that they speak
to an official "from Albany"; that is,
someone with authority from the central office. From that point on, the Assistant Commissioner became the lead
negotiator, although he worked closely
with the department negotiator and the
deputy superintendent.

•

At Mack Alford, two trained department negotiators were brought to the
prison. After about an hour, however,
the inmates broke off the dialog,
claiming that the negotiators had lied
to them. They then insisted that they
would speak only with a particular
captain, whom they trusted. The captain remained the chief negotiator
throughout the disturbance.
The Coxsackie and Mack Alford negotiations, while successful, did not follow the model. In both cases, however,
important principles were preserved.
Neither the assistant commissioner at
Coxsackie nor the captain at Mack
Alford exercised authority in the situa-

Third-Party Negotiators
n some instances, bringing In an
individual from outside the correctional
agency may prove useful in negotiations.
Third parties were used in negotiations at
Atlanta, Mack Alford, and Talladega.
They played several roles:
• As initiators of conversations. At

Mack Alford, two popular inmate leaders
who were not participating in the riot
were recruited during its opening stages
to initiate conversation with the rioting
inmates who (at that point) refused to
talk to the administration.
• As guarantors to a promise. At
Mack Alford, three State legislators were
present at the surrender to reassure inmates that they would not be mistreated
by corrections staff.
• As guarantors that an agreement is
authentic and in the inmates' interest. At Atlanta, Bishop Agustin Roman

(auxiliary bishop of Miami) made an audiotape stating that he supported the
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agreement. To overcome a last-minute
snag in the negotiations, Bishop Roman
assured the detainees that BOP personnel
who signed the agreement had the authority to make a binding commitment.
• As mediators searching for middle
ground. At Atlanta, a legal services attor-

ney worked to develop a solution that was
acceptable to both sides. He raised substantive issues with BOP administrators,
and they responded in a written memo
clarifying the Bureau's position. At the
same time, the attorney helped persuade
the Cuban detainees to accept the agreement without a clause declaring that deportations would cease.
• As government bargaining chips. At
Talladega, the BOP allowed a reporter to
talk to the detainees and report their story
in return for the release of a hostage. At
Coxsackie, commanders allowed the inmates' leader to have a 2-minute telephone conversation with his stepfather.
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tion. Thus, the advantages that come
with splitting the command and negotiation functions were not forfeited. An
additional advantage was the increased credibility of the negotiators
in the inmates' eyes.
Third-party involvement. In some
situations, the assistance of parties
from outside the agency may advance
the negotiation process. The purpose
of third-party involvement must be
kept clearly in mind by administrators,
who must be certain they make the decision to implement it on the basis of
merit alone. Other criteria (such as
the political prominence of the individual volunteers) must not be factors in
the decision. Third-party negotiators
must be carefully screened and agree
not to raise new issues or to act as advocates for inmates. 12

Cycles of negotiation
Studies of negotiations in other domains, especially labor-management
bargaining, have found that they tend
to follow a common cycle. Initially,
both parties make exaggerated demands. This is followed by a period of
withdrawal and a return to negotiations
with more moderate demands. When
parties try to circumvent this ritual,
negotiations tend to break down. 13
Even concessions made too early in
the negotiation process can be counterproductive because parties "need
the opportunity to experience exhaustion of their demands before they can
be satisfied that they had drained what
was there to be had. Premature movement robs them of this experience." 14
This pattern seems to have been followed at Atlanta. During the first several days, government negotiators
perceived the detainees were not interested in making progress in the negotiations. The detainees used
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negotiation sessions as an "opportunity
to express their longstanding frustrations"15 rather than achieve a settlement. However, this changed during
the course of the disturbance. Government negotiators noted that the detainees became increasingly punctual at
negotiation sessions, sometimes even
arriving early, which was taken as an
indication that they had become increasingly serious about them. 16
On the other hand, a similar cycle
did not develop at Talladega. The
Talladega detainees and the government were as far, if not farther, apart
at the end of the disturbance than at
the start. Likewise, at Coxsackie inmates seemed more anxious and hostile as the incident progressed. In
cases like these, issuing an ultimatum
may be in order when negotiations
appear unproductive.

Ultimatums
When negotiations deadlock or are not
taken seriously, commanders may
decide to issue ultimatums. In prison
riots they can be categorized as useof-force ultimatums and issues
ultimatums.
The use-of-force ultimatum. A useof-force ultimatum can be given in the
expectation that inmates, given a clear
choice between surrender and an
armed assault, will choose surrender.
In the riots studied, such ultimatums
were issued at Camp Hill (the second
riot) and at Kirkland and led to successful resolutions.
At Camp Hill, the State Police declared over a public address system
that inmates were to release their
hostages, surrender by exiting the
cellblocks, and lie face down on the
yard. At Kirkland, the warden
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announced over the public address
system that the riot squad had been
deployed, that it was instructed to use
force if necessary, and that the inmates should lie face down on the
ground. The warden used language
that was simple, direct, and forceful.
In both instances there were no retaliations against hostages, and the riots
ended shortly thereafter.
Issues related to the use-of-force ultimatum concern how to handle the
transition from negotiation to force.
Should government negotiators be
alerted that an assault will occur?
Many say no, because the negotiators
might inadvertently reveal the plan.
Others point to possible advantages:
The negotiators might he able to distract the subject at the start of the assault, provide reassurances that would
lower his or her defenses, or position
him or her for a sniper shotY None of,
these advantages was foreseen by commanders at Talladega, and the Regional Director elected not to inform
the government negotiators of the
planned tactical strike.
What are the consequences if inmates
refuse to surrender? At Kirkland and
Camp Hill, use-of-force ultimatums
were successful; in both instances riot
squads were visible to inmates as they
were deployed, a situation that may
have contributed to the inmates' willingness to choose surrender. But a
use-of-force ultimatum should be issued with every intention offollowing
through. Otherwise, future ultimatums
will have less credibility.
The "issue" ultimatum. The principle
behind issue ultimatums is that once
inmates are told that some or all their
demands will not be met, they will stop
making these demands and focus on 1
matters that can be negotiated. Police
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"tegotiators generally discourage the
use of this type of ultimatum and advise: "Never tell the subject 'no."' 18 Instead, negotiators should try to recast
demands so that they can be met or so
they pose no immediate threat.
This advice seems reasonable for
prison riots. An exception was the
situation observed at Atlanta. Over the
course of 6 days, the detainees, Cuban
nationals, demanded assurances that
they could remain in the United
States. Administrators were reluctant
to tell the detainees that this issue was
not negotiable because they feared
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they might retaliate against the hostages. The detainees refused to drop
the issue, however, and the negotiations reached an impasse. Finally, a
government negotiator told the inmates
that their demand would not be met
under any conditions. In this instance,
a straightforward "no" broke the impasse without provoking retaliation
against the hostages and allowed the
negotiations to go forward.

Waiting
A third strategy for handling a prison
disturbance is to wait it out, usually
while maintaining a dialog. In law en-

forcement, hostage negotiators often
stall for time. 19 The theory behind this
strategy holds that hostage-takers tend
to develop sympathy for their hostages,
develop a rapport with police negotiators, or just get tired of doing what
they are doing. In light of this theory,
police hostage teams are encouraged
to avoid the temptation to "get it over
with" but rather to patiently wait out
the situation unless material threats to
a hostage's safety or other considerations force a reassessment of tactics.
At Talladega continued waiting may
have endangered the hostages because

Exhibit 1: Key Factors of Eight Prison Riots Studied
Institution

Duration

Number of
Hostages

Method of
Resolution

Kirkland
Correctional
Institution

6 hours

22

Ultimatum
and riot squad

U.S. Penitentiary,
Atlanta, Georgia

11 days

More than 100

Mack Alford
Correctional
Center

3 days

8

Negotiations and
"waiting" strategy

Coxsackie
Correctional
Facility

14 hours

5

Negotiations

Idaho State
Correctional
Institution

1 day

None

3 days
(two riots)

First riot 8
Second riot 18

First riot
negotiations
Second riot
State Police Force

About 1 hour

None

Immediate force
by riot squad

10 days

11

Pennsylvania State
Correctional
Institution
at Camp Hill
Arizona State
Prison Complex
(Cimarron Unit)
Federal
Correctional
Institution,
Talladega
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Negotiations

Ultimatum and
riot squad

Negotiations used
and abandoned in
favor of planned
tactical strike
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hostility among the detainees was beginning to increase. Negotiations formally ended the disturbance at Mack
Alford, but in large measure the disturbance succumbed to massive defection and inmate exhaustion. After 3
days of rioting, only a fraction of the
original participants remained on the
yard.
Although a waiting strategy may imply
passivity on the part of the administration, usually the opposite is the case.
Research on police hostage negotiations,20 as well as negotiations in other
contexts,21 emphasizes the importance
of active listening: paying careful attention to what is said, asking the
speaker to clarify what she or he meant,
and communicating to the speaker that
she or he was understood. Active listening can be extraordinarily demanding. The regional director in charge of
Talladega's resolution reported that officials at the scene were continuously
trying to discern what the detainees
wanted and what they were trying to
do, and to gather clues about their tactical situation.
A waiting strategy can employ tactics
that will, by increasing inmates' discomfort, directly motivate them to end
the incident more quickly or create
needs that prison administrators can
then use to effect a bargain. At Atlanta
helicopter overflights put pressure on
inmates, and water and heat to the
compound were cut off. At Talladega,
food, which was in short supply to
begin with, was denied. At Coxsackie
and Mack Alford, the electricity was
turned off. Each of these deprivations
became negotiating points for the
government.
Hostages, however, have to endure the
same deprivations as inmates. At
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Talladega detainees and hostages went
10 days with very little food. Administrators were also concerned about a
breakdown of order among hungry detainees. In this situation, rather than
follow the theory of "increasing situational stress if the subject is too comfortable," it seemed more prudent to
follow the corollary of "decreasing
stress if the subject is very anxious. " 22
Since the detainees at Talladega were
showing signs of increasing tension and
hostility toward the hostages, food was
provided to ameliorate that situation, to
lower the detainees' defenses, and,
hopefully, get food to the hostages.

After the riot
A riot's aftermath consists of shortterm problems such as securing the
prison, medium-term problems related
to repairing the damage and returning
staff to work, and long-term problems
related to restoration and change. The
specific short-term tasks should be included in the riot plan.
The short term
After the inmates surrender, commanders must coordinate a search for
contraband, move inmates to secure
units, conduct damage assessments,
and ensure that all inmates are accounted for. Medical care must be provided to injured hostages and inmates.
Evidence must be collected for future
prosecutions. If outside staff or law enforcement personnel were requested,
they must be released from duty as order is restored.

The importance of performing these
tasks cannot be overstated. Having resolved the riot, the temptation to lower
vigilance and assume that the worst is
over may be premature. Therefore, riot
plans should contain checklists and
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guidelines for the immediate postriot
period.
After the first disturbance at Camp
Hill, some of the essential post-riot
tasks were not completed. The count
was not cleared,23 and weapons and
other debris were left in the hallways
of blocks to which inmates were returned. Although the locking mechanisms of cell doors had been
compromised, inmates were returned
to them, and inmates were observed
wandering outside their cells throughout much of the night after the first
riot. The institution's administrators
were largely unaware of these problems because the information never
reached them. In hindsight it seems
that they should have gone to the
blocks to assess the damage themselves instead of relying on the reports
of others. Unaware of these problems,
the superintendent at Camp Hill dismissed all but 25 of the 260 State Police officers who had been called to
help quell the first disturbance. The
25-officer contingent fell far short of
the number needed to prevent the far
more destructive riot that began the
next day.
In the other disturbances studied,
these tasks were handled without major problems. At Cimarron, a pressing
issue in the immediate aftermath was
the provision of medical care to the inmates who had been injured. One was
evacuated by helicopter for emergency
surgery, and 10 others were transported to hospitals by ambulance. The
remainder of the inmates were
searched and locked in their cells, and
a count was taken. The inmates identified as being most active in the riot
were placed in the facility's detention
unit. The entire prison was searched
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LOr weapons, but no buildup of weapons was found.
At Coxsackie the immediate aftermath
of the incident was handled with an
especially high level of control and,
therefore, a greater certainty of results.
Inmates not requiring immediate
medical attention were moved to the
gymnasium, separated from one another by 20 feet of space, instructed
not to talk, and supervised by one, and
later two, correctional officers per inmate. Each inmate was examined by
medical staff and then interviewed by
the State Police, staff members from
the department's Inspector General's
Office, and staff members from the
Commission of Correction. Five hours
after the riot's resolution, they were
transferred in small numbers to other
facilities.
· mmediate postriot tasks at Atlanta
mainly involved transferring the detainees to other facilities. Over a 24hour period, they were escorted out of
the compound one at a time. BOP staff
searched detainees with the aid of a
fluoroscope, placed them in restraints,
and put them on a bus for transfer to
another facility.
One of the immediate responsibilities
of the governing agency is to help employees overcome the short- and longterm traumas of the disturbance.
Mental health professionals may play a
crucial role in debriefing staff after
disturbances. 24 In general, prison administrators and officers interviewed
for this study stated that such debriefing sessions were useful. In some departments, such as South Carolina's,
they are mandatory. At Coxsackie each
of the released hostages was accompanied by a mental health professional
,md a close friend during initial medical treatment and debriefing.
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The medium term
In the medium term, prison administrators must provide continued support
to employees in coping with their experience, repair the damage done to
the facility, work toward normalization
of institutional operations, and undertake the administrative followup associated with a disturbance.
Public recognition of the sacrifices
made by hostages, as well as an expression of appreciation for the exemplary action of staff during the riot,
may be important in reintegrating the
corrections community. Following
Talladega, for example, the Acting Attorney General commented that he felt
"grateful beyond words and proud beyond measure." This recognition can
also be made at public ceremonies
such as one held by the Oklahoma
State Legislature. Ongoing counseling
and support for former hostages may
be necessary as well.
Damage to the structural integrity of
the facility must be addressed. At Coxsackie the inmates destroyed the control center of the SHU so they could
not immediately be returned to their
cells. The inmates at Idaho knocked
holes between cells, rendering many
of them unusable. In the largest, most
destructive riots, such as those at
Atlanta and Camp Hill, major reconstruction was needed.
During the medium term, a report may
be commissioned to find out why the
incident occurred. The report may
help corrections officials, policymakers, and the public understand what
the riot was about, thereby helping to
establish a long-term reform agenda. It
may help answer the question of
whether systemwide changes are
needed or only minor policy adjust-
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ments. Official inquiries into the eight
riots under study varied in several
ways, discussed in the following
sections.
Issuing agency. At Camp Hill the Governor commissioned a blue-ribbon
panel to investigate the disturbance,
and two legislative committees each
wrote independent reports. Following
the Cimarron incident, the Director of
Corrections requested that another
State agency, the Department of Public
Safety, conduct the investigation to ensure objectivity, in light of the fact that
there had been racial tensions at the
unit. The investigations of the ISCI
and Mack Alford riots were conducted
by members of the respective States'
central offices. At Coxsackie, the New
York State Commission of Corrections
(the body responsible for monitoring
all correctional facilities in New York)
conducted the investigation (its staff
had been on the scene soon after the
riot started). In response to both the
Atlanta and the Talladega riots, the
BOP established teams consisting primarily of senior staff and representatives from the other Federal agencies
involved in the riot's resolution.
Scope of the investigation. The reports on the Camp Hill disturbance
were the most far reaching, raising issues about the riot's management and
related concerns such as prison crowding and alternatives to incarceration.
The reports at Coxsackie, Mack
Alford, and ISCI focused primarily on
the riots themselves rather than any
far-reaching implications. The authors
of the reports on Atlanta, and to a
lesser extent Talladega, used the opportunity to rethink the BOP's entire
emergency preparedness effort. At
Cimarron the focus was primarily on
whether the use of force was justified
and complied with department policy.
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Audience. The results of the investigations at Cimarron, ISCI, and Mack
Alford were intended primarily for use
by those in the central offices of the
State agencies. The reports on Coxsackie, the two Federal prison disturbances, Atlanta and Talladega, and
Camp Hill were written for those
within the agency, policymakers concerned with corrections, and to some
degree, the general corrections
community.

Long-term solutions
A prison riot, by definition, means loss
of control by prison administrators.
Once they are resolved, prison riots
can provide an opportunity for correctional leaders to develop policy that
reflects what they have learned, provided they listen carefully and think
clearly about the events. A corrections
department can become stronger, less
likely to lose control, and more effective in resolving disturbances when a
prison riot is followed by one or more
of the following outcomes.
Gains are made in the ability to forecast a disturbance, and the flow of information is improved. Corrections
officials, having experienced a disturbance, may be more aware of and better able to interpret future warning
signs.
Previously unrecognized problems
are remedied. Riots may reveal weaknesses in facilities, operating procedures, or organization. It is better to
ask how the problems can be resolved
than argue about whether certain actions contributed to the riot.
The outcome of innovations made
during the disturbance are reviewed
and incorporated into riot plans. During the Atlanta disturbance, for ex-
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ample, the BOP developed the idea of
setting up a center for the hostages'
families-a place where they could
obtain information and support. Its
success led the Bureau to make this a
standard feature of its response.
Relationships with other agencies are
improved. During a riot new relationships among agencies may emerge or
the need for them may be demonstrated, as at Camp Hill. After a disturbance, gains should be consolidated
and relationships strengthened.
Innovations are made in the reconstruction process. The postriot period
can be used to restore what existed before the disturbance or to depart from
tradition. For example, after the Mack
Alford disturbance, the employees, including correction officers, case managers, and maintenance workers,
became involved in developing plans
to reconstruct the prison. A delegation
was sent to several prisons in another
State to develop ideas about architectural design. This break with tradition
(previous architectural planning had
been conducted only in the central office) helped create a sense of ownership among Mack Alford staff.
Morale is addressed. A riot is unlikely
to leave employees' morale untouched.
Much depends on what happened during the riot and the outcome. If the
resolution went well, if employees perceived that corrections management
faced the crisis squarely and with
adequate resources and preparation,
and if the responses of the political
community and media were positive,
then the disturbance may actually enhance the prison staffs sense of mission, loyalty, and confidence in their
agency. Where these factors are absent, morale may plummet.
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Camp Hill provides an example of
some serious problems facing corrections administrators in a prison riot's
wake, but also shows how such challenges can be met. A new commissioner of corrections and a new
superintendent were hired. The commissioner reorganized the central office, secured a grant from the National
Institute of Corrections to revamp the
department's system for emergency
preparedness, and improved relationships with other State agencies involved in emergency planning. The
new superintendent helped direct the
rebuilding of the facility.

Conclusion
The eight riots in this study are obviously not representative of every
prison disturbance. The unique characteristics of each institution, its staff,
administration, and inmate popula- 1
tions, as well as the State or Federal
agency to which it belongs, shape the
precipitating conditions, resolution,
and aftermath of a riot. Comprehensive
planning based on awareness of other
incidents and lessons learned from the
past cannot prevent all prison riots. It
can, however, help correctional administrators avoid some disturbances, take
action to prevent the small incident
from expanding into a full-scale riot,
limit the extent of damage of riots in
progress, and terminate riot situations
in the least costly way.
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